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Resumen
Utilizando métodos que controlan factores observables y no-observables, este trabajo evalúa el programa 
de entrenamiento para desempleados PROBECAT/SICAT en México. La comparación de los resultados 
a lo largo del tiempo permite evaluar el tamaño y evolución del sesgo oculto. También se calcula el efecto 
promedio de tratamiento (ATE) y el efecto de tratamiento en los tratados (ATET). El enfoque aplicado 
permite darle seguimiento al mecanismo de selección del programa y evaluar las consecuencias de 
cambios en la cobertura. Encontramos que el programa no tiene impacto en los salarios pero sí  tiene un 
pequeño impacto en la empleabilidad de los participantes. El sesgo oculto es importante, pero declina 
con el tiempo y el mecanismo de selección pasa de negativo a neutral. Estos dos aspectos parecen estar 
relacionados con un importante cambio estructural en el diseño del programa que tuvo lugar durante el 
período bajo evaluación. Se concluye que el método paramétrico que controla por no-observables resulta 
el más apropiado para esta evaluación.
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Abstract
We evaluate the Mexican training program for the unemployed PROBECAT/SICAT using methods that 
control for observable and non-observable factors. Comparing the different results over time allows us 
to gauge the size and evolution of hidden bias. We also compute the average treatment effect and the 
treatment effect on the treated. Our approach reveals the evolution of the program’s selection mechanism 
and judges the consequences of its expansions and contractions. We find that the program has a small 
though significant effect on employability, but no effect on wages. The hidden bias is large but declines over 
time and the selection mechanism turns from negative to neutral. These two aspects seem to be related 
to an important structural change in the design of the program that took place during the period under 
evaluation. All these results lead us to conclude that a parametric method controlling for un-observables 
provides the most complete tool for evaluating this program.
Keywords: Evaluation, Training Programs, PROBECAT/SICAT, Parametric methods, Mexico
1. Introduction
The Mexican program for training the unemployed has been in place for more than twenty years, but has 
received scant scrutiny. Revenga, Tiboud and Tan (1994), Wodon and Minowa (1999), Navarro-Lozano 
(2003) and Calderón (2005) have evaluated the impact of this program on employability and after-training 
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wages. These studies, like many empirical and theoretical papers on evaluation, have one or more of the 
following shortcomings: they refer to a single old-dated period, make use of a single evaluation parameter 
(i.e. the treatment effect on the treated), and make use of a particular evaluation method. In order to 
overcome these shortcomings, we perform several evaluation techniques on a long dataset spanning a 
recent five-year period (2000-2004).
Following Lee (2005), we make use of both parametric and non-parametric methods controlling for 
observables and non-observables. Comparing the different results over time allows us to gauge the size and 
evolution of hidden bias. Additionally, we compute both the average treatment effect and the treatment 
effect on the treated. Comparing these parameters allows us to reveal the evolution of the program’s 
selection mechanism and judge the consequences of its expansions and contractions.
We find that the Mexican training program for the unemployed has a small though significant effect on 
employability, but no effect on wages. The hidden bias is large but declines over time and the selection 
mechanism turns from negative to neutral. These two aspects seem to be related to an important structural 
change in the design of the program that took place during the period under evaluation. All these results 
lead us to conclude that a parametric method controlling for un-observables provides the most complete 
tool for evaluating this program.
The paper has four additional sections. Section two provides an account of the evolution of the pro-cyclical 
behavior of unemployment and informal employment with respect to economic growth in Mexico, and 
describes the evolution of the PROBECAT/SICAT training for the unemployed programs. Section three 
reviews the previous impact evaluations of the training programs for the unemployed. Section four includes 
our main results and the results of a benefit cost analysis of the program. Finally, section five concludes 
with a summary of results.
2. The economic and institutional background2 
2.1. GDP growth, unemployment and informality
Despite the inflexibility of labor contractual arrangements in Mexico, the unemployment rate is very 
sensitive to changes in the level of economic activity.  Between 1996 and 2000 the unemployment rate 
and the GDP moved in opposite directions, whereas after 2000, growth slowed down considerably and 
the unemployment rate started to rise again. Therefore, a steady economic growth seems to be crucial for 
the level of employment. Graph 1 shows the GDP annual growth rate together with the absolute annual 
change in the unemployment rate for the period 1980 to 2003. The correlation coefficient between both 
series is -0.7, which is very significant. Although unemployment remained low on average, it changed quite 
dramatically in response to variations in the level of economic activity.
The main characteristics of the unemployed include:
•	The	group	with	senior	high	school	and	university	degrees	are	the	most	represented	among	the	
unemployed
•	Most	job	seekers	are	either	very	young	or	are	already	mature	workers
•	The	duration	of	unemployment	has	 remained	 stable	 from	1997	up	 to	2004:	 about	60%	of	 job	
seekers	remain	unemployed	for	less	than	4	weeks;	25%	take	between	one	and	two	months	to	find	a	
job and the rest more than two months. These facts suggest that unemployment itself does not seem 
to be a big problem in Mexico, at least not more than in other modern economies
2 The working paper version of this article contains more information on Mexico´s economic and institutional development in the 
decades prior to the application of the program analyzed here. See Delajara, Freije and Soloaga (2006).
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rate are associated with changes in the extent of informal employment; most job seekers are 25 years old 
or younger. This suggests that the main problem in the Mexican labor market is the creation of formal jobs 
for young people. 
Informality	in	labor	relations	and	arrangements	affects	between	40%	and	60%	of	the	labor	force	employed	
in Mexico, depending on the way we measure informality. Economists tend to think that informality 
is related to ill-conceived firm and labor legislation regarding the regulation and taxation of economic 
activity that ultimately hurts small and medium-sized firms and their workers’ welfare3.  
The dynamics of informality are similar to those of the unemployment rate. Informality declines with 
employment. Since the unemployment rate is low, however, there is an obvious limit to using employment 
policies to curb the huge informality that can be observed in the Mexican labor market. 
2.2. Institutional capacity for labor training programs
Reforming the Mexican labor market institutions and laws has probably been the most difficult part of the 
pro-market reform process started by the Mexican federal government in the mid 1980s. 
Subsequent labor legislation has been incapable of fostering labor productivity and the creation of 
enough formal employment opportunities. Among the obstacles to achieve these objectives are: the high 
3 Others think that the informal sector is the consequence of lack of growth and supportive social policies. For more on informal 
labor markets in Latin America see -just two among the myriad of references- Loayza (1997) and IBERGOP (2005).
Graph 1.
Mexican labor markets suffer, however, from informality and the lack of employment opportunities for the 
country’s youth. A large share of the labor force works in the informal sector; swings in the unemployment 
Source: Banco de Información Económica, INEGI (2013).
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costs of hiring and firing employees; a pro-worker paternalist legal framework; lack of alternative wage 
setting mechanisms, in particular mechanisms that take into account productivity gains; and excessive 
intervention of labor unions in wage setting mechanisms, labor contracts, and firms’ decisions regarding 
the role of human resources in production.
Since at least the mid1970s, Mexico’s federal government has followed active labor market policies and has 
consistently built institutional capacity to implement those policies.
The Servicio Nacional de Empleo, Capacitación y Adiestramiento (SNE) was established in 1978 as part of 
a reform to the Federal Labor Law (Ley Federal del Trabajo). Its main objectives were to improve job seeker 
and potential employer matching, to increase the chances of the unemployed of finding a job, and to study 
the labor market in order to improve labor market policies.  
During the years which followed the sovereign debt crisis of 1982, workers’ real wages declined sharply 
due to the higher inflation rate and the fall in the demand for labor. Informal labor started to grow fast. 
In order to curb informality and improve matching between job seekers and vacancies, the government 
adopted an even more active labor market policy stance, which consisted of strengthening the SNE, as well 
as their policies and resources. 
In 1984, the SNE implemented the training program for the unemployed  Programa de Becas de 
Capacitación para Trabajadores Desempleados (PROBECAT), which is the focus of the analysis in this 
paper.
In 1988, this policy was further strengthened with the launching of the Programa de Calidad Integral para 
la Modernización (CIMO) which provided training to employed workers in their own small and medium-
sized firms. Further innovation to the policy was introduced in 1993 with the launching of the Sistema 
Normalizado y de Certificación de Competencias Laborales which sought to clearly establish the workers’ 
competencies  so that the PROBECAT and CIMO training programs could focus more efficiently on the 
abilities and knowledge that firms demanded from the workers.
The SNE is in charge of CIMO and it plays an important role in defining workers’ competencies. The 
SNE decides the way these programs are going to be implemented, while the federal government sets the 
normative framework and provides the resources; the programs are then implemented in each Mexican 
state by the Servicios Estatales de Empleo (SEE), with the help of additional state funds.
The scope of activities and processes that the SNE must implement and monitor has thus grown 
considerably, leading to the subsequent development of SNE’s infrastructure and resources. The SNE 
started with headquarters in Mexico City and only five branches across Mexico in 1978, with the number 
of offices climbing to 139 in 2002. This administrative organization is additionally supported by 77 units 
run by the SEE. About 2100 employees run the whole system, 920 at federal level and about 1180 at state 
level. 
Its budget has been growing as well. In 2002, the SNE spent 110 million pesos on programs associated with 
the matching of job seekers and potential employers and other worker-firm intermediation activities; as 
well as more than 700 million pesos on the implementation of PROBECAT.
The SNE runs all the different types of training available for the unemployed through PROBECAT: training 
offered through regular courses at technical and other schools (school-based training, now discontinued); training 
offered at the firm (firm training, also called mixed training); training aimed at helping the self-employed (self-
employed training); and training for those involved in local employment initiatives (local employment training).
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We conclude that the institutional capacity to implement PROBECAT has, at least formally, been 
consistently built and sustained over the years. The question remains whether a public institution like 
SNE, with a country- and economy-wide scale of operations, is efficient at all. In particular, taking into 
account the mandatory nature of training at firms and the need to regulate and monitor it, it is difficult 
to determine whether the growth of SNE’s institutional capacity is just inertial and a by-product of the 
mandate to train workers or the result of a carefully planned strategy.
2.3. Description of the Program 
The launching of PROBECAT in 1984 aimed at providing assistance and training for the unemployed. In 
2001 its name was changed to SICAT (Sistema de Capacitación para el Trabajo) and since 2005 changed 
again to Bécate (Becas a la Capacitación para el Trabajo)4.
The beneficiaries of the program receive a scholarship equivalent to a minimum salary while they take part 
in a three-month training course; about 4.75 million workers have been trained between 1984 and 2005. 
Graph 2 shows the evolution of the number of participants or trainees.
In the first 10 years of the program, 71 thousand workers were trained on average every year. The scale of 
operations increased dramatically after 1994; from 1995 to 2000, 530 thousand workers were trained on 
average	every	year.	During	the	years	1999	and	2000,	nearly	20%	of	unemployed	workers	received	training	
in this program. The numbers of trainees has decreased steadily since then and the figures for 2005 are 
similar to those of the pre-1994 period, whereas by 2011 the number of trainees was above 300 thousand.
4 Currently, the PNE programs operate through five subprograms: Bécate, Empleo Formal, Fomento al Autoempleo, Movilidad 
Laboral Interna and Repatriados Trabajando. http://www.stps.gob.mx/bp/secciones/conoce/marco_juridico/PAE_reglasopera.pdf
Graph 2.
Source: Banco de Información Económica, INEGI (2013).
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The SNE is the institution in charge of organizing and implementing the program with the aid of the 
regional offices of SEE (Servicios Estatales de Empleo). While the SEE decides the type of training activities 
to be offered as well as the capabilities and abilities that the trainees should develop during their training, 
the SNE is in charge of providing the funding for these activities. Funding channeled by the SNE covers the 
workers’ scholarships and all the costs associated with the training activities.
The total amount of resources allocated to the program is shown in Graph 3. The evolution of these 
resources is similar to that of the number of trainees, but the real expenditure per trainee has a negative 
trend, starting from above 2500 Mexican pesos (of 1993) in the mid 1980s to between 500 and 1000 
Mexican pesos of 1993 in the mid 2000s. In the beginning PROBECAT offered just one type of training 
program called escolarizada, i.e. school-based training. This training consisted basically of spending the 
three months of training attending classes at a public school –sometimes the SEE would also hire ONGs 
to provide this type of training. Upon completing the training, workers would look for a job using the 
placement services available at the SNE and the SEE.
A few years later, an on-the-job training modality was introduced. This type of training known as mixta 
(mixed) consisted of training carried out at the firm’s plant or workshop. The SNE paid for the workers’ 
scholarships, while the SEE paid for the operating costs and the firm financed the training itself. After the 
training,	70%	or	so	of	the	trainees	would	be	hired	by	the	firm	and	the	rest	would	try	to	find	a	job	through	
the SNE placement offices. 
There is a large difference between both types of training activities; while the escolarizada offered a general 
type of education, the mixta offered a specific type of training. It is not clear whether unemployed workers 
could choose between one of these two activities or if they were just assigned to them by SEE clerks. 
Graph 3.
Source: Own based on  PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases.
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There is some evidence, however, that the SEE distinguished between workers with and without previous 
experience, between qualified and unqualified workers, and between temporary unemployed workers and 
self-employed informal workers. 
The escolarizada type of training was dominant until 1998 when the mixta started to receive a larger share 
of the trainees. In 1994, other types of training were also established, the most important of them being the 
so-called training for the self-employed (autoempleo). Therefore, after 1994 the share of trainees allocated 
to the escolarizada type of training started to decline and the program was terminated in 2001. Since 2002 
the	mixta	and	autoempleo	types	have	dominated	the	training	activities	accounting	for	about	60	and	30%	
of	the	trainees,	respectively	(see	Graph	4).	For	the	period	1998-2005,	45%	of	trainees	in	the	mixta	type	
received	training	at	medium	and	large	firms	and	55%	in	small	firms.
The	PROBECAT	by-laws	require	that	firms	involved	in	the	mixed	modality	should	hire	at	least	70-80%	of	
workers at the end of the training period. Since SNE monitors and enforces this requirement, participating 
firms are most likely to belong to the formal sector of the economy. Therefore, firms in the informal sector 
are very unlikely to participate in the program. 
In this context, the SNE mission is twofold: to manage PROBECAT and to serve as a placement office 
for the unemployed. The 1999 and 2000 training effort was impressive but achieved at the expense of 
placement efficacy. This variable is measured by the ratio of vacancies filled by the SNE with unemployed 
workers to the number of unemployed workers trained by the SNE through PROBECAT, declined from 
1997 to 1999 when it reached its lowest value. As the training effort decreases after 2000, placement efficacy 
starts to increase again. After 2002, both SNE’s placement efficacy and training effort show a negative 
trend, however.
Graph 4.
Source: Own based on  PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases.
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2.4. Operational Capacity
In several official documents we find that the purpose of PROBECAT, Mexico’s training program for the 
unemployed, was to improve matching between the suppliers of labor and their potential employers, to 
increase the employment probabilities and future wages of the unemployed, and to improve the productivity 
and competitiveness of firms. Thus, inefficient matching, high unemployment, informality, low wages and 
low productivity were implicitly considered a consequence of the low level of human capital in the Mexican 
labor force.
From these official documents it is clear that the program’s target populations were those characterized 
by low levels of schooling, low wages, high unemployment, low share of qualified labor, high level of 
informality in the labor markets; and that the Mexican states with the worst labor market indicators would 
require relatively more resources. 
We thus conjecture that for PROBECAT to achieve its objectives, the resources allocated to Servicios 
Estatales de Empleo (SEE) in each state should be higher the worse the situation of the labor markets. 
We summarize here our analysis of the SEE’s operational capacity, that is, whether the SEE had enough resources 
available to achieve the objectives of PROBECAT5. The main findings indicate that the operational capacity 
allocated to the SEE has been either unrelated or negatively related with the size of their needs6. In particular:
•	The	 budged	 allocated	 per	 trainee	 to	 each	 state´s	 SSE	 seemed	 at	 best	 weakly	 associated	 with	 the	
unemployment rate
•	 Contrary	to	the	objectives	of	the	program,	states	with	higher	average	years	of	education	received	more	
resources per trainee than states with a lesser educated labor force
•	 For	the	years	1998-2001,	spending	per	trainee	was	driven	basically	by	spending	per	training	activity,	that	
is, per training course, from which it follows that the average number of trainees taking each course has 
varied widely across states
•	 Since	2001	the	resources	for	PROBECAT	were	channeled	toward	the	mixed	type	of	training,	with	the	
result that states with better labor market indicators (that is, where most of the firms are located) received a 
larger budget per trainee and per course
3. A review of previous evaluations 
There has been a series of impact evaluations of the Mexican training program for the unemployed. Each study 
adopts different methods, databases and evaluates different outcomes. In this review, we emphasize only those 
issues that are comparable to our study.
The first analysis is by Revenga, Riboud and Tan (1994), who use a retrospective database for beneficiaries of the 
1992 cohort. They estimate a probit model in which the probability of employment three months after training 
depends on age, education, experience, unemployment duration, seasonal dummies and a program participation 
indicator variable7.	The	authors	find	that	participants	have	an	8%	point	higher	probability	of	finding	a	job	than	non-
participants. Besides, they estimate an earnings equation corrected for selectivity and find that monthly earnings of 
male	trainees	are	around	17%	higher	than	male	non-trainees,	but	are	not	significantly	different	for	females8.
5 A more detailed analysis is presented in Delajara, Freije and Soloaga (2006).
6 Similar conclusions were found when relating spending to wages, informal employment and share of skilled worker per state.
7 This probit model has a selectivity correction that is not fully explained in the text. See Revenga, Riboud and Tan (1994), pages 
262-266.
8 The earnings equation in this case has experience, education and its interactions as explanatory variables. The program participa-
tion equation, not shown in the paper, controls for marital status, number of children, education and duration of unemployment.
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The Mexican Ministry of Labor completed a similar study shortly after Revenga’s. STPS (1995) makes 
use of a similar database, but for the 1993 cohort. They also estimate earnings equations corrected for 
selectivity and find positive effects of around 200 pesos a month for males, but no effect for females, with 
large benefits for those with experience and taking on-the-job training. They also find a positive impact 
on the probability of finding employment of around 20 percentage points, both for males and females, for 
those taking on-the-job training9.
Five years later, Wodon and Minowa (1999) criticize the previous studies on several grounds. They 
notice that using as controls a sample from ENEU with a high probability of participating in the program 
induces contamination bias: that is, there may be observations in the control group that actually took the 
training. Also, the earnings equations correct for selectivity in taking the program but not for selectivity in 
participating in the labor market. Wodon and Minowa address these two issues by estimating a probability 
model of participating in one of the two training modalities (i.e., on-the-job and school-based) using 
the ENEU and ENCOPE surveys for the 1993 cohort10. Then they use the fitted index (not the fitted 
probability) as an instrument for program participation in a duration model and an earnings equation 
corrected by labor market participation. Their program participation models have an explicit exclusion 
restriction: number of program participants as a proportion of state population. They find a negative effect 
on wages for men who had school-based training, and no effect on women or another modality. They also 
find a positive effect on employment for women who had school-based training11.
More recently, Calderón and Trejo (2001) also make use of the data for the 1993 cohort for a study that, 
for the first time, adopts propensity score matching for the evaluation.12 The authors compute difference-
in-difference for wages before and after training between controls and treatments selected according to a 
sort of nearest neighbor matching. They find that the program had a negative effect on hourly wages for 
men	under	every	modality	(around	35	cents/hour,	that	is	less	than	10%)	and	a	positive	effect	for	women	
under some modalities (similar size). They are also the first to estimate a model that assumes selection 
on un-observables, following the procedure proposed by Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2003). With this 
methodology	they	find	a	larger	negative	effect	on	wages	of	24%.
Finally, Navarro-Lozano (2002) uses the same 1993 cohort data and explores the Heckman et al. (2001, 
2003) methods further. This author is the only one that contrasts different methods and parameters of 
interest. He compares the estimates of the treatment effect on the treated (ATT) from a non-parametric 
estimation using propensity score matching to a parametric estimation using selection correction methods. 
However,	only	wage	effects	for	males	are	gauged	in	this	study.	He	finds	a	positive	wage	effect	of	10%	when	
using	the	selection	correction	methods,	but	a	negative	effect	of	–15%	when	using	matching.	In	addition,	
Navarro-Lozano estimates the marginal treatment effect (MTE) and finds it indicates a positive selection 
(that is, those who benefit the most from the program are more likely to participate in it)13.
9 See STPS (1995) tables V.7 and V.10bis. The employment effects, in this case, were derived from a Cox hazard duration model.
10 We also make use of these samples, but for more recent years. A thorough explanation of these samples can be found in section 
4.2.
11 No actual size of the effects in pesos or percentage points was provided in this paper.
12 There is the study by Aportela (2003) but it only estimates the impact on unemployment duration. Since we are interested in 
comparing results in terms of probability of employment and wages, we do not comment on this report.
13 Given the debate sparked in the literature on the methods for program evaluation, and the complaint by several authors about 
the methodological ambiguity of some studies, a detailed explanation of the methods used in this study can be found in Delajara, 
Freije and Soloaga (2006).
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The study by Calderon-Madrid (2005) is the only one that makes use of a more recent database. 
He computes the impact of the program on the probability of employment transitions (from 
unemployment to formal and informal employment) as well as on wages making use of data for 
2004. He finds that the beneficiaries of the SICAT program have higher probabilities of finding 
formal employment but lower probabilities of finding an informal job than comparable control 
individuals. On the other hand, he finds no robust evidence of a positive impact on wages. Making 
use of several matching procedures, as well as panel and cross-sectional data, he finds either no 
significant effect or effects that differ by method of estimation.
This literature review has two common strands. First, all the studies -with the exception of 
Calderón-Madrid (2005)- make use of a database more than ten years old and of a single year 
database. Second, results depend critically on the methods used. Third, most studies, with the 
exception of Navarro-Lozano (2002), only measure the effect with the parameter known as ATT, 
that is average treatment effect on the treated. Our study aims at releasing the evaluation of 
PROBECAT-SICAT from these constraints. We make use of several databases spanning a five-
year period (2000-2004), so a story of the evolution of the program’s impact can be obtained. 
Besides, we adopt two different methods of impact evaluation and compute several parameters of 
interest, which allows the study to report not only the robustness of the average effects by different 
methods, but also to describe the selection mechanisms that underlie the program. As will be 
explained later, our methods allow us to discuss the existence of hidden bias in the estimates. 
Finally, we will report both the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT), which allow us to discuss the selection mechanism of the program and 
infer whether the program attracts individuals that benefit the most from it.
4. Methods of Impact Evaluation and its applications
4.1. Methods
The exposition presented elsewhere (Delajara, Freije and Soloaga, 2006) makes it clear that a 
correct impact evaluation has to take into consideration the existence of selection bias and its 
components: overt and hidden bias. Methods of impact evaluation cling to assuming either one 
or both biases. Hence, methods can be divided into two categories: methods assuming selection-
on-observables and methods assuming selection-on-unobservables. 
Furthermore, since the parameters of interest are conditional expected values, two approaches 
can be adopted for estimation. First, a non-parametric approach that computes sample averages 
of the form:
 
    
Yi1 − w(i, j)
j
∑ Yji0
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥i
∑
N      [1]
where w(i,j) is a function that assigns weights to each control observation j with respect to the 
treatment observation i, and N is the relevant number of observations. 
Second, a parametric approach that assumes that conditional expectations can be modeled as functions 
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(linear or non-linear) of the form:
    
Yi j = f Xi,β,ui( ) j = 0,1    [2]
so
 
    
E Y j X⎡⎣ ⎤⎦= f X,β( ) j = 0,1    [3]
Therefore, the impact evaluation methods can be classified into four categories, depending on 
assumptions about hidden and overt biases, and on the method for computing expectations. For this 
study we have chosen two opposite methods: first, propensity matching score with nearest neighbor 
controls, which is a non-parametric method assuming selection on observables and, second, selection 
correction, which is a parametric procedure assuming selection on unobservables. For the former we 
have adopted the methodology developed by Becker and Ichino (2002) based on the seminal work of 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). For the latter we follow the methodology proposed by Heckman, Tobias 
and Vytlacil (2003). We have chosen these methods for the sake of robustness and, as will be seen below, 
because comparing these two methods provides additional insights on the performance of the program 
under evaluation14. 
4.2 Available data
We make use of three different surveys in this study: the ENCOPE (Spanish acronym for Employment 
survey of PROBECAT/SICAT beneficiaries), the ENECE (Spanish acronym for National Training and 
Education Survey) and the ENEU (Spanish acronym for Urban Employment Survey). All of them are 
produced, with varying periodicity, by the Mexican statistics bureau (INEGI). 
The ENEU is a survey that provides information on human capital and labor force characteristics for 
the population aged 12 and over in cities with no less than 100.000 inhabitants. This survey has been 
conducted every quarter since 1988. It has a rotation mechanism that makes it possible to identify 
individuals for five consecutive quarters. It is important to clarify that each individual in the rotating 
panel is interviewed at a fixed span of 13 weeks. In other words, for a given year, if one individual was 
interviewed in the first week of January he/she will be re-interviewed in the first week of April, again in 
the first week of July, again in the first week of October and then, for the last time, in the first week of 
January of the following year. Every week of each quarter an approximately fixed number of individuals 
is interviewed until completion of the sample size for that quarter. This characteristic of the ENEU will 
become important since the data for the treatment group do not follow the same pattern. 
The ENECE is a special module introduced in the ENEU every second year from 1991 to 1999, and 
every year since 2001. It provides socio-demographic information for individuals aged 12 and over as 
well as information on formal schooling and training. It provides individual data on number of courses, 
type of training, duration, place and sponsoring of training. Since the ENECE is just an ENEU module, 
information on training can be matched with all human capital and labor participation characteristics 
for sampled individuals.
Finally, ENCOPE is a survey that interviews a sample of PROBECAT-SICAT beneficiaries between 
three and six months after finishing their training. Although it has detailed information on the 
14 For an extensive account of program evaluation methods, see Lee (2005), Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Wooldridge (2001). 
For a discussion on evaluation methods applied to anti-poverty programs, see Ravallion (2005).
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type of course taken, socio-demographic characteristics and labor participation at the moment 
of the interview, it has limited information on labor conditions during or before training15. It is 
important to mention that ENCOPE captures information on individuals at a point in time and 
asks the informant to recall information on several issues, which could be distant in time. 
ENCOPE contains information on the interviewees’ labor market participation that is analogous 
to information collected from ENEU, which allows us to select individuals for the treatment 
and control groups with similar information. From ENCOPE we took as treatment observations 
those individuals who were unemployed on starting the program and who completed the training 
course. From ENEU we took as control observations those individuals who had been unemployed 
two weeks or less when the treatment group started the training course.
The starting of the training program is a critical moment that we call time “To”.  We explicitly 
assume that the labor market experience of individuals in the treatment group before the starting 
of the program is the same as the experience of individuals in the control group. We call this 
experience “clock 1”. What we measure is the impact of PROBECAT using a second labor market 
experience clock that starts at “To”, what we call “clock 2”, by pairing the recently unemployed 
from ENEU with those who take training from ENCOPE. Graph 5 shows how these two clocks 
work. On the horizontal axis we have time in weeks. On the vertical axis we have one measure of 
15 Currently, this survey is quite different in terms of scope and available information from the surveys used for the previous 
evaluations, such as Revenga, Riboud and Tan (1994), Wodon and Minowa (1997), Calderón and Trejo (2001) and Navarro-Lozano 
(2002).
Graph 5. Search and training for treatment and control groups
Source: Author’s own.
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the expected impact on an outcome variable (for instance, probability of finding a job). At time 
“To” we have people in the treatment group starting the course and people in the control group 
just becoming unemployed (or with less than two weeks of unemployment). Our evaluation 
consists of measuring what happened to the treatment and control groups in “To”+13 weeks and/
or “To”+26 weeks. In this illustration, training increased the probability of finding a job for those 
in the treatment group whereas those in the control group also experience a change in their 
probability of finding a job, seemingly lower16. 
This timing implies that unemployed individuals decide either to take training or to stay 
unemployed and search for a job. In this sense, the evaluation tries to measure which of these two 
strategies renders a higher benefit, in terms of employment and wages, for the unemployed. Other 
studies have gauged the impact of the program in terms of unemployment duration after training, 
but it is important to understand that taking a training course is a job-search strategy that may, 
or may not, be more successful than simply keep looking for a job as an unemployed individual. 
Hence, comparing individuals with training and individuals without training, counting weeks of 
unemployment after the end of training is not the most correct comparison. Instead, we compare 
the probability of finding a job 13 or 26 weeks after a moment of unemployment (the moment 
“To”) between individuals who take training after that moment and individuals who do not.
As indicated above, ENCOPE provides information regarding the span of time between the date 
of the interview and “To” when the course was initiated.
We will select control observations from ENEU, but need to deal beforehand with two issues. 
First, ENEU contains individuals that may have taken a training course. This issue would 
contaminate the control group. In order to clean ENEU from this problem, we use data from 
ENECE to estimate the probability for the unemployed of participating in a training course. 
Those individuals with a probability higher than 0.5 were discarded from the control group17. 
Second, the structure of ENEU implies re-interviews in a fixed period of time (13, 26, 39 and 
52 weeks after the first interview). Consequently we will have labor market information for the 
controls at regular periods of time: 13, 26, 39, and 52 weeks. 
The combination of treatments from ENCOPE and controls from matched ENEUs provides 
several datasets. The characteristics of these working databases are presented in Table 1. These 
datasets are then processed according to the program evaluation techniques explained in section 
4 so as to make the treatments and controls fully comparable, and the results are summarized in 
the next section. 
4.3 Results
We apply the abovementioned methods to data for different years and groups. This allows us 
to test the robustness of the hypotheses on selection mechanisms. It also makes it possible to 
examine the evolution of the program’s impact over time. Finally it enables us to verify whether 
the program has differential impacts on various groups of beneficiaries.
It is important to highlight that we evaluate the impact on the probability of being employed 13 or 26 weeks 
after starting a training program. In addition, we evaluate the impact on wages for those who actually 
have a job either 13 or 26 weeks after starting training. However, given the duality of the Mexican labor 
16 Since unemployment could be conjunctural (i.e., between jobs) or structural (i.e., long lasting unemployment), implicitly we are 
assuming that the distribution of these two types of unemployment is the same in the control and treatment groups.
17 Estimates of this probit model can be found in Annex I of Delajara, Freije and Soloaga (2006)
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics from selected observations from ENEU and ENCOPE
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
T C T C T C T C T C T C
Gender
Man 36.5 60.4 29.8 58.9 31.0 64.3 32.8 67.3 37.2 62.0 29.1 60.1
Woman 63.5 39.6 70.2 41.1 69.0 35.7 67.2 32.7 62.8 38.0 70.9 39.9
Kinship
Household head 18.1 23.6 12.7 23.7 16.3 25.8 16.1 25.8 18.9 25.2 16.8 24.1
Spouse 31.6 8.8 39.0 9.6 31.7 6.5 28.9 7.4 21.4 8.9 26.3 9.0
Son/ Daughter 46.5 58.5 45.1 57.4 44.2 59.5 44.2 58.7 49.9 58.4 47.5 58.9
Other 3.8 9.1 3.2 9.3 7.7 8.2 10.7 8.1 9.8 7.5 9.4 8.1
Marital Status
Married 46.0 33.1 48.1 32.9 46.6 33.3 45.9 33.4 38.4 33.8 44.1 32.8
Single 50.0 62.2 48.1 60.9 48.9 62.1 50.3 61.3 57.0 62.5 51.2 63.0
Without couple 3.5 4.7 3.8 6.2 4.5 4.6 3.8 5.3 4.7 3.8 4.7 4.1
Age
12 to 15 0.1 2.8 0.2 2.6 0.1 2.3 0.1 3.6 0.2 3.5 0.0 4.0
16 to 25 53.8 53.6 51.0 54.3 53.5 52.7 58.4 53.8 53.1 55.0 48.7 54.4
26 to 35 25.2 23.5 26.2 22.9 24.7 24.6 23.9 21.5 29.0 21.3 30.6 20.7
36 to 45 14.1 12.2 16.1 11.8 13.6 11.7 11.0 12.4 12.3 12.7 13.0 12.7
46 to 55 5.5 4.8 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.2 5.1 5.9 3.9 4.9 5.5 5.9
56 or more 1.2 3.1 0.6 2.4 2.2 2.6 1.5 2.9 1.5 2.6 2.2 2.2
Schooling
No schooling 2.0 2.3 3.1 2.1 1.3 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.1 1.9 1.4 2.2
Elementary School 28.4 22.3 27.3 19.6 23.8 19.8 24.7 21.4 14.7 21.1 17.3 19.7
Junior High School 40.9 30.7 43.7 34.1 38.6 31.4 39.0 33.8 31.3 34.9 26.4 32.8
High School 22.3 23.4 21.0 23.6 27.3 24.9 25.8 24.0 28.1 22.3 26.8 26.5
Graduate School 3.8 21.0 0.8 20.2 8.7 21.8 9.5 18.7 23.8 19.6 28.1 18.6
Region
North 13.2 32.0 30.6 31.4 20.4 32.1 18.4 34.1 21.1 24.5 17.6 18.4
Gulf 22.3 13.2 19.7 14.9 15.5 15.0 14.6 15.6 9.4 14.3 10.4 11.5
Pacific 11.6 12.3 2.7 13.5 14.1 10.6 14.7 11.1 13.9 14.5 11.1 15.5
South 13.3 7.0 5.1 6.8 10.6 6.3 15.5 6.0 11.0 5.2 7.1 7.2
Center-North 17.2 17.7 24.0 18.6 20.3 22.0 22.3 16.7 14.3 22.6 20.7 28.6
Center 12.8 9.0 5.2 8.6 11.7 7.4 7.8 10.0 10.0 9.6 8.4 8.0
Capital 9.7 8.8 12.6 6.2 7.3 6.7 6.8 6.5 20.2 9.3 24.7 10.9
Labor market  
Prior Experience 54.7 86.7 44.9 86.3 48.1 89.0 58.9 88.7 71.7 87.8 62.6 86.8
Employed (+26) Formal 58.0 60.2 39.6 58.8 44.0 60.7 58.4 62.8 49.9 60.3 40.7 57.8
Employed (+26) 0.0 27.0 19.2 28.6 15.9 28.8 34.6 27.4 31.1 26.0 20.6 19.6
Source: selected observations from ENEU and ENCOPE databases (see section 4.2) 
Notes: T refers to treatment observations (from ENCOPE) and C refers to control observations (from ENEU)
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market, it is not reasonable to think that employment in the informal sector is an outcome equivalent to 
employment in the formal sector. Furthermore, the PROBECAT/SICAT program has different training 
modalities for those who seek a formal job and those who want to be self-employed. Consequently, our 
impact evaluation distinguishes employment and wage effects for those who took the mixed and school-
based modalities, on the one hand, and for those who took the other modalities, on the other e. For the 
former group, finding a job in the formal sector is a success, whereas being unemployed or having an 
informal job is a failure. For the latter group, having a job, either formal or informal, is a success. This 
separation allows us to take into consideration the quality of the job as well as the type of training for a 
stricter impact evaluation.
Given the large array of results, we first explain the findings according to the non-parametric method 
that assumes selection on observables. Then, we explain the outcomes according to the parametric 
method that assumes selection on un-observables. We compare the results between these methods and 
derive insights on which method appears to give a better account of the program’s evolution. Finally, we 
add a section that specifically deals with the impact of the program for different program modalities and 
population groups. 
4.4 According to the non-parametric method, assuming selection on observables
When the program to be evaluated is not implemented in a randomized way, one can resort to quasi-
experimental methods to describe the impact of the program. In quasi-experimental designs, targets 
receiving the intervention are compared to a control group of potential targets that do not receive the 
intervention. To the extent that the latter resemble the intervention group on relevant characteristics 
and experiences, or can be statistically adjusted to resemble it, then program effects can be assessed with 
Year All cases salaried Non salaried
13 weeks (1) 26 weeks (2) 13 weeks (3) 26 weeks (4) 13 weeks (5) 26weeks (6)
Average Treatment effect (ATE)
1999 -13.8*** 2.8 7.5 4.9
2000 -10.6*** -0.9 -1.2*** 0.2 6.1*** 8.5***
2001 -14.8*** -12.9*** -6.1 -4.2 5.5* 4.6*
2002 3.5 3.4 29.6*** 21.9*** 19.9** 24.1***
2003 3.5 2.0 26.8*** 15.3*** 10.9 6.9
2004 -6.3** -6.4 16.5*** 27.6*** -4.3*** -1.4
Average Treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
1999 -18.1*** 0.2 6.5** 6.6
2000 -6.6** 2.1 -0.5 0.0 6.1** 10.4***
2001 -14.8*** -11.7** 3.1 -3.7 7.8** -1.8
2002 0.8 -3.1 24.5*** 11.0 13.6** 16.1**
2003 0.8 0.1 17.2*** 9.8* 3.9 14.7***
2004 -8.7* -10.2 4.7 14.9*** 1.6 1.6
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases.
Table 2. Employment effects according to selection on observables
PROBECAT-SICAT impact on probability of employment, in percentage points. Matching selection on observables.
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Year All cases salaried Non salaried
13 weeks (1) 26 weeks (2) 13 weeks (3) 26 weeks (4) 13 weeks (5) 26weeks (6)
Average Treatment effect (ATE)
1999
2000 -515 *** -717 *** -613 *** -663 *** -1250 *** -900 ***
2001 -232 *** -226 ** -361 *** -463 *** -755 * -1345 ***
2002 -347 *** -432 *** -359 *** -458 *** -689 -1075 *
2003 -291 *** -317 ** -853 *** -761 *** -1197 ** NA
2004 -266 * -348 -943 *** -464 ** NA NA
Average Treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
1999
2000 -427 *** -744 *** -446 *** -660 *** -1550 *** -913 ***
2001 -339 *** -392 *** -546 *** -552 ** -671 -444
2002 -341 *** -622 *** -323 ** -523 ** -1514 -925
2003 -174 -308 -1027 *** -808 ** -648 NA
2004 -230 -580 * -1188 *** -557 * NA NA
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases
Table 3.  Wage effects according to selection on observables
PROBECAT-SICAT impact on probability of employment, in pesos per month. Matching selection on observables.
a reasonable degree of confidence18.
One way to select the control group ex-post is by using the matching method. This technique is commonly 
applied in evaluation research and basically consists of finding a “twin” or “partner” for each of the treated 
individuals. In matching design, the intervention group has already been specified. It is the evaluator’s 
task to construct a control group by selecting targets unexposed to the intervention that match those in 
the intervention group on selected characteristics. The logic of this design requires that the groups be 
matched in any characteristic that would cause them to differ in the outcome of interest under conditions 
when neither of them received the intervention. To the extent that the matching falls short of equating 
the groups in characteristics that will influence the outcome, selection bias will be introduced into the 
resulting program-effect estimate. For instance, if age is a key factor in affecting a given outcome--e.g., 
finding a job in three months for an unemployed person—to avoid bias, the matching of people receiving 
the treatment and not receiving it should be done considering, among other factors, the person’s age19.
Once the matching is done, we can then calculate the estimated gain from the program, following Becker 
and Ichino’s (2002) protocol. Table 2 shows the estimated ATE and ATT for the probability of having a 
job after 13 and 26 weeks of starting training (i.e., after “To” in Graph 5) for years 1999-200420. The first 
column shows the year analyzed, whereas columns 2 and 3 show the impact on the probability of having a 
job 13 and 26 weeks after starting training respectively in general (i.e., without distinguishing between the 
program modalities). Columns 4 and 5 show the same but for those who attended the classes for salaried 
18 However, the presence of unobserved characteristics that could be related to the outcome could posit a restriction to the useful-
ness of these methods.
19 For a more detailed explanation of the procedure see http://idbdocs.iadb.org/WSDocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=907641&-
Cache=True, Methodological Annex.
20 The standard errors were estimated following the option bootstrap r(att) and bootstrap r(ate) from psmatch2.
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positions, whereas columns 6 and 7 show the same for those who attended classes for self-employment 
positions. The upper panel shows the ATE and the lower panel the ATT. 
When we analyze the impact without distinguishing between program modalities we observe that there 
is a somewhat positive trend. For ATE (i.e., the expected impact for a person selected at random from 
the population) the estimated impact after 13 weeks of finishing training changed from a negative –13.8 
percentage points in 1999 to a positive impact of 3.5 in 2003 (see column 1, upper panel, Table 2), but a 
negative –6.3 in 2004. In the case of 26 weeks, the figures are 2.8 and -6.4 respectively (see column 2). For 
this latter case, the impact was in general higher than that of 13 weeks. Similar results were found when 
estimating the ATT (i.e., the estimated impact for a person that actually decided to take the training) as is 
shown in the lower panel of the table. It should be pointed out that the results for ATE and for ATT at 13 
weeks were positive in years 2002 and 2003 only (although not significantly different from zero) and at 26 
weeks for all years (also not significantly positive either) except 2001. 
We have also estimated the impact taking into account that there are different job qualities and modalities 
for the training. For the case of training the unemployed that seek a job as an employee, following columns 
3 and 4 we find that the ATE is positive and significant from 2002 onwards. The ATT for 13 weeks and 
26 weeks is similar. For the modality of training for self-employment (see columns 5 and 6), results are in 
general positive both for ATE and ATT, but significant only in some years with an irregular trend.
Table 3 shows the impact on monthly wages after 13 and 26 weeks of starting training for years 
1999-2004. One striking result from this table is that all numbers that are statistically significant 
are negative. This means that if an average person from the population had taken the training his/
her expected wage would have been lower than if that average person had not taken the course (ATE 
results). Results are the same for those individuals that have actually taken the training (ATT results). 
The negative impact for ATE ranges from –291 pesos per month 13 weeks after finishing training in 
2003, to -1345 pesos per month 26 weeks after finishing training for self-employment in year 2001. 
The negative impact for ATT ranges from -174 (statistically non-significant) to –1550 pesos for those 
that took training for self-employment in 2000. To put these numbers into context, the average impact 
of	–232	pesos	for	2001	(column	1	in	Table	3)	represents	about	8%	of	the	average	monthly	salary	of	a	
person in the respective control group. In turn, the highest expected loss of -1250 pesos for year 2000 
(column	6)	represents	about	57%	of	 the	average	monthly	salary	of	a	person	in	the	relevant	control	
group.
Obviously, these results of lower probabilities of finding a job, for some years, and lower wages for 
trainees, almost always, are so contrary to what would be expected that they beg for an explanation. 
Before going into it, the next section presents another way of calculating the impact of the PROBECAT-
SICAT (control for unobservables) that will provide an important piece for this puzzle. 
4.5 According to the parametric method, assuming selection on unobservables
As explained in section 4, assuming selection on observables may lead to erroneous conclusions if 
there are unobservable variables that are important in explaining program participation and treatment 
effects. Following our previous example, if work ethics is important in explaining participation in the 
program so that those who participate have, on average, a higher work drive than those who do not 
participate, and such work motivation also leads to a higher probability of finding a job, then not 
controlling for this unobserved variable may ascribe to the program effects that really correspond 
to the participants’ work effort and not to the training. The problem then is how to control for un-
observed variables.
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Year All cases Salaried Non salaried
13 weeks (1) 26 weeks (2) 13 weeks (3) 26 weeks (4) 13 weeks (5) 26weeks (6)
Average Treatment effect (ATE)
1999 13.6 *** 6.7 *** 9.1 *** 11.2 ***
2000 -18.5 *** 6.7 *** 11.4 *** 25.7 *** -2.4 *** -10.7 ***
2001 6.7 *** 22.6 *** 8.1 *** 23.3 *** 0.2 8.2 ***
2002 19.6 *** 27.6 *** 24.5 *** 39.6 *** 27.6 *** 36.0 ***
2003 2.5 *** 3.6 *** 25.8 *** 7.2 *** 67.1 *** 49.7 ***
2004 -14.9 *** -15.4 *** 2.9 *** 12.1 *** 9.3 *** 6.2 ***
Average Treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
1999 6.0 *** 2.6 *** 6.3 *** 10.0 ***
2000 -18.8 *** 6.4 *** 3.2 *** 18.2 *** -5.9 *** -14.8 ***
2001 -8.7 *** 9.8 *** -6.4 *** 6.4 *** -10.9 *** -1.9 ***
2002 12.6 *** 16.6 *** 20.1 *** 23.9 *** 12.3 *** 16.4 ***
2003 -0.3 0.9 *** 14.5 *** 3.2 *** 8.3 *** 11.9 ***
2004 -13.0 *** -13.5 *** 3.1 *** 11.4 *** -1.8 *** -4.0 ***
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases.
Table 4. Employment effects according to selection on un-observables
PROBECAT-SICAT impact on probability of employment, in percentage points. Regression controlling for observables.
Year All cases Salaried Non salaried
13 weeks (1) 26 weeks (2) 13 weeks (3) 26 weeks (4) 13 weeks (5) 26weeks (6)
Average Treatment effect (ATE)
1999
2000 131 *** 395 *** 1124 *** 1684 *** 506 *** 142 ***
2001 -72 *** -125 *** -45 *** -50 *** -499 35
2002 54 *** -13 -14 -13 690 *** -1741 ***
2003 2 151 *** 25 250 *** -1225 *** -315
2004 -21 -16 -54 * 1304 *** 251 -627
Average Treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
1999
2000 223 *** 487 *** 1323 *** 2105 *** 299 *** 132 ***
2001 -55 *** -43 *** 11 21 * 58 *** 285 ***
2002 107 *** 33 ** 27 53 ** 1116 87
2003 59 *** 204 *** 66 *** 291 *** 519 *** 588 ***
2004 114 *** 47 * 89 *** 1218 *** 441 *** 424 ***
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases.
Table 5. Wage effects according to selection on un-observables
PROBECAT-SICAT impact on probability of employment, in pesos per month. Regression Controlling for observables.
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Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001, 2003) propose a parametric method for dealing with the 
problem of selection on unobservables. Basically, it consists of running an econometric model for 
explaining the variable of interest (in our case, employment and wages) controlling for the usual 
observable variables (the same vector X of the previous section) and adding a variable that controls 
for the distribution of the unobservable variables. This distribution is assumed a priori and the 
validity of the procedure hinges on this assumption being correct.
In general, the procedure follows four stages. First, obtain the parameters of a probit model on 
the decision to take the treatment; second, compute the appropriate correction for unobservables 
term; third, run separate outcome-specific regressions for the treatment and control groups with 
appropriate unobservables-correction terms obtained from the previous step; and fourth, given the 
parameters of these regressions, obtain point estimates for each observation and compute the ATE 
and ATT parameters according to specific formulas21.
Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the employment and wage effects, respectively, according to the 
parametric method assuming selection on un-observables. The employment effects for the treated 
(ATT) show a kind of inverted-U trend for general employment both at 13 and 26 weeks after 
starting training. These trends, with mostly positive and significant values can be seen both for 
salaried and for self-employment. This inverted-U trend means that employment effects for years 
2002 and/or 2003 are significantly positive and larger effects than for previous and subsequent 
years. With some exceptions, the employment effects according to selection on unobservables are 
larger than according to selection on observables.
The wage effects for salaried workers are mostly positive and significant. Oddly, years 2000 and 
2004 show sizeable positive effects for salaried workers that do not recur but look very large (more 
than 1,000 pesos): these would represent nearly two thirds of the monthly wage of a person in 
the respective control group. Wage effects for self-employed workers are usually positive and 
significant.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 positive	 and	 significant	 effects	 is	 also	 quite	 large	 (between	 50%	 and	
100%	of	the	monthly	wage	of	a	person	in	the	respective	control	group).	
4.6 Comparison of results between methods
Comparing the ATE and the ATT provides information on the program’s selection mechanism, 
in particular on whether the program is attracting those who benefit the most from it or whether 
it does the opposite. Second, comparing the ATE or the ATT between methods hints at whether 
there is a problem of hidden bias. Finally, comparing results for each method over time allows us 
to ascertain whether there is a program impact robust to evaluation methods and data collection 
period.
Table 6 to Table 9 summarize the results of our estimations with a compilation of the employment 
and wage ATE and ATT, distinguishing two methods and two types of workers: salaried and self-
employed. One main conclusion can be derived from each table. The employment effect of the 
program on the treated (ATT) is significantly positive, according to both methods, for salaried as 
well as self-employed workers in most of the years considered (see Table 6). On the other hand, 
wage effects vary radically by method, as well as by period and type of worker (Table 7).
With respect to employment effects, there are several regularities we would like to highlight. First, 
for salaried workers, the difference in estimates assuming selection on observables and selection 
on unobservables declines from large and positive in 2000 to small and negative in 2004 (see Table 
21 Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacl (2001) develop the specific formulas for ATE and ATT under their procedure.
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W
eeks after starting training:
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
13
26
13 
26
13
26
13
26
13
26
13
26
Average Treatm
ent effect (ATE)
A
ssum
ing selection-on-observables (non-param
etric)
Salaried
N
A
N
A
-1.2
0.2
-6.1***
-4.2
29.6***
21.9***
26.8***
15.3***
16.5***
17.6***
(1.6)
(2.2)
(1.7)
(2.9)
(3.5)
(4.5)
(2.8)
(3.8)
(3.6)
(3.8)
Self-em
ployed
7.5
4.9
6.1***
8.5***
5.5*
4.6*
19.9**
24.1***
10.9
6.9
-4.3***
-1.4
(5.2)
(4.8)
(1.9)
(1.4)
(3.1)
(2.8)
(8.5)
(7.0)
(11.2)
(5.7)
(1.6)
(3.8)
A
ssum
ing selection on observables (non param
etric)
salaried
N
A
N
A
11.4***
25.7***
8.1***
23.3***
24.5***
39.6***
25.8***
7.2***
2.9***
12.1***
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.4)
(0.3)
(0.2)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(3.0)
(2.0)
(0.3)
Self em
ployed
9.1***
11.2***
-2.4***
-10.7***
0.2
8.2***
27.6***
36.0***
67.1***
49.7***
9.3***
6.2***
(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.3)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.4)
(0.6)
(0.5)
(0.8)
(4.0)
(0.6)
Average Treatm
ent effect on the treated (ATT)
A
ssum
ing selection-on-observables (non-param
etric)
Salaried
N
A
N
A
-0.5
0.04
3.1
-3.7
24.53***
11.02
17.2***
9.8*
4.7
14.9***
(2.3)
(2.6)
(3.2)
(3.7)
(5.5)
(6.9)
(3.4)
(5.1)
(5.3)
(5.7)
Self-em
ployed
6.5***
6.6
6.1**
10.4***
7.8**
-1.8
13.6**
16.1**
3.9
14.7***
1.6
1.6
(3.0)
(4.1)
(3.0)
(1.6)
(3.9)
(2.3)
(5.6)
(6.6)
(6.5)
(5.1)
(3.8)
(7.9)
A
ssum
ing selection on observables (non param
etric)
salaried
N
A
N
A
3.2***
18.2***
-6.4***
6.4***
20.1***
23.9***
14.5***
3.2***
3.1***
11.4***
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.3)
(0.4)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.3)
Self em
ployed
6.3***
10.0***
-5.9***
-14.8***
-10.9***
-1.9***
12.3***
16.4***
8.3***
11.9***
-1.8***
-4.0***
(0.2)
(0.3)
(0.2)
(0.3)
(0.5)
(0.6)
(0.6)
(0.7)
(0.8)
(0.7)
(0.4)
(0.7)
Source: Authors’ calculations using PRO
BECAT, EN
EU
 and EN
ECE databases.
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Salaried Workers
employment effect 26
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
Obs 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -4.2 -3.7 0.5 22.0 11.0 -10.9 15.3 9.8 -5.5 17.6 14.9 -2.7
Non-Obs 25.7 18.2 -7.6 23.3 6.4 -16.9 39.6 23.9 -15.7 7.2 3.2 -4.0 12.1 11.4 -0.7
Hidden 
Bias 
25.5 18.1 -7.4 27.4 10.1 -17.3 17.7 12.9 -4.8 -8.1 -6.6 1.5 -5.5 -3.5 2.0
employment effect 13
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
Obs -1.2 -0.5 0.7 -6.1 3.1 9.2 29.6 24.5 -5.0 26.8 17.2 -9.6 16.5 4.7 -11.8
Non-Obs 11.4 3.2 -8.2 8.1 -6.4 -14.5 24.5 20.1 -4.4 25.8 14.5 -11.3 2.9 3.1 0.2
Hidden 
Bias 
12.6 3.7 -8.9 14.2 -9.5 -23.7 -5.1 -4.4 0.6 -1.0 -2.7 -1.7 -13.6 -1.6 12.0
Self Employed Workers
employment effect 26
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
Obs 8.5 10.4 1.9 4.6 -1.8 -6.4 24.1 16.1 -8.0 6.9 14.7 7.8 -1.4 1.6 3.0
Non-Obs -10.7 -14.8 -4.2 8.2 -1.9 -10.1 36.0 16.4 -19.6 49.7 11.9 -37.8 6.2 -4.0 -10.2
Hidden 
Bias 
-19.2 -25.3 -6.1 3.5 -0.1 -3.6 11.9 0.3 -11.6 42.8 -2.8 -45.6 7.6 -5.6 -13.2
employment effect 13
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
Obs 6.1 6.1 0.0 5.5 7.8 2.3 19.9 13.6 -6.3 10.9 3.9 -6.3 -4.3 1.6 5.9
Non-Obs -2.4 -5.9 -3.5 0.2 -10.9 -11.1 27.6 12.3 -15.3 67.1 8.3 -15.3 9.3 -1.8 -11.1
Hidden 
Bias 
-8.5 -12.0 -3.6 -5.3 -18.7 -13.4 7.7 -1.3 -9.0 56.2 4.4 -9.0 13.6 -3.4 -17.0
Notes:
Hidden bias is the difference between the estimates assuming selection on unobservables minus the estimates assuming selection on 
observables.
Selection is the difference between ATT and ATE. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases.
Table 8. Evolution of hidden bias and sign of selection for employment effects
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8, row entitled “hidden bias”). This means that up to year 2002, there was an important “hidden 
bias” and, hence, assuming selection on observables could be misleading. An interpretation of this 
“hidden bias” could be that individuals who participate in the program exert, on average, less effort 
in looking for a job than individuals who do not participate. Therefore, when not controlling for this 
unobservable variable, the matching method is not taking into account the fact that participants use 
less effort (or some other unobservable variable that is associated with lower employment rates). 
Again, this hidden bias appears to decline from 2002 onwards and both methods show similar 
results in 2003 and 2004.
Second, the difference between the ATT and the ATE for salaried workers according to both 
methods is mostly negative, but is usually greater in year 2001 or 2002 than in other years. These 
years represent important changes in the program. Particularly, the school-based modality was 
phased out and the mixed modality was enhanced (see Graph 4). Since a positive difference between 
ATT and ATE mean a positive selection mechanism (i.e., those with greater expected benefits from 
the program are also those with a higher probability of entering the program), then it seems that 
the decline in the negative selection (observed under both methods) portrays an indication that 
program modifications induce a better targeting in its use.  This is because the concentration of the 
program	in	the	mixed	modality	(with	its	requirement	that	firms	should	hire	80%	of	the	trainees)	
ought to be associated with an increasing employment impact (seen in both methods) and better 
selection (i.e., those who would benefit most from it are more likely to select it). The greater impacts 
of the program in 2002, 2003 and 2004 can also be associated with the concentration on the mixed 
modality. 
With respect to the self-employed, the effect on the treated (ATT) according to selection on 
unobservables varies from negative in years 2000 and 2001, to positive in 2002-2003 and negative 
again in 2004. These results are accompanied by a negative selection mechanism (see Table 8, lower 
panel). This seems to indicate that the self-employment and productive project modalities attract 
individuals who benefit less from the program (perhaps, those who find it very difficult to become 
self-employed by themselves), but occasionally help them. A similar trend is observed according 
to selection on observables, but with mostly positive results. The trend of the hidden bias and the 
selection effect differs across methods and over time, so no clear pattern can be recognized.
The wage effects, as mentioned earlier, differ by method of estimation. Table 3 shows that wage 
effects on the treated (ATT) are negative for all workers every year when assuming selection on 
observables. On the other hand, these effects are usually positive if assuming otherwise (see Table 
5). Table 9 shows that, in the case of salaried workers, there is a positive and large hidden bias. 
This hidden bias is often as large as the negative wage effect reported by selection on observables. 
Consequently, the wage effect on the treated for the salaried is generally positive and small (this 
is less than 100 pesos a month)22. In the case of self-employed workers, the hidden bias varies in 
sign and size. Notwithstanding this, the wage effect on the treated is always positive but fluctuates 
wildly in size. Given the instability of results, it appears that the program does not have a robust 
and steady impact so its wage effects upon those in salaried employment or who are self-employed 
are somewhat haphazard.
22 Important exceptions to this are the bizarre positive wage effects of nearly 2,000 pesos a month for the year 2000 (at 13 and 26 
weeks) and 1,000 pesos a month for the year 2004 (at 26 weeks).
32 Marcelo Delajara, Samuel Freije and Isidro Soloaga
Salaried Workers
employment effect 26
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion(2)
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
Obs -663 -660 3 -463 -552 -89 -458 -523 -65 -761 -808 -47 -464 -557 -93
Non-Obs 1684 2105 422 -50 21 70 -13 53 66 250 291 41 1304 1218 -86
Hidden 
Bias 
2347 2765 419 413 572 159 445 576 131 1011 1099 88 1768 1775 7
employment effect 13
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
Obs -613 -446 167 -361 -546 -185 -359 -323 36 -853 -1027 -174 -943 -1188 -245
Non-Obs 1124 1323 199 -45 11 56 -14 27 41 25 66 41 -54 89 143
Hidden 
Bias 
1737 1769 32 316 557 240 345 350 5 878 1093 215 889 1277 388
Self Employed Workers
employment effect 26
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
Obs -900 -913 -13 -1345 -444 901 -1075 -925 150
Non-Obs -112 132 244 285 -782 -1067 -1741 87 1828 -315 588 903 -627 424 -1051
Hidden 
Bias
788 1045 257 1630 -338 -1968 -666 1012 1678
employment effect 13
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
ATE ATT Selec-
tion
Obs -1250 -1550 -300 -755 -671 -689 -1514 -825 -1197 -648 549
Non-Obs -51 299 351 58 -824 -882 690 1116 426 -1225 519 1744 251 441 -190
Hidden 
Bias
1199 1849 651 812 -153 -882 1379 2630 1251 -28 1167 1195
Notes:
Hidden bias is the difference between the estimates assuming selection on unobservables minus the estimates assuming selection on 
observables.
Selection is the difference between ATT and ATE. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases.
Table 9. Evolution of hidden bias and sign of selection for wage effects
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Modality 13 26 13 26 13 26 13 26 13 26 13 26
School- based -6.2*** -32.4*** -3.8*** -26.5*** -1.4 -36.4***
(0.4) (0.5) (0.1) (0.2) (3.4) (2.8)
Mixed 15.1*** 11.9*** 22.5*** 23.4*** 29.7*** 26.0*** 20.8*** 15.1*** 22.5*** 16.9***
(0.7) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5) (1.9) (1.9) (0.7) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6)
MyPEs(3) 1.4** -8.7*** 0.4 -4.4*** -3.4* -14.5*** 2.9*** 6.4*** 3.8*** 9.9***
(0.6) (0.6) (0.3) (0.4) (1.8) (1.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.6) (0.8)
Self - employment(4) -8.6*** -16.2*** -10.2*** -22.4*** -4.7** -15.7*** -2.0*** -0.2 -18.6*** -13.7*** -17.5*** -10.7***
(0.5) (0.5) (0.2) (0.2) (2.3) (1.7) (0.7) (0.8) (1.0) (0.7) (1.0) (1.4)
ILE(5) NC NC NC NC NA NA
Basic skills 5.3*** -34.2*** -6.9*** -17.9*** NA NA
(1.7) (1.5) (0.5) (0.8)
Sinorcom(6) -6.9*** -30.9*** -14.0*** -25.8*** NA NA
(1.4) (1.34) (0.3) (0.3)
Health sector 19.4*** 14.1*** -20.2*** 0.4 NA NA
(2.0) (2.2) (3.8) (2.9)
Bouchers for training -29.0*** -18.1*** -27.5*** -19.2***
(1.0) (1.0) (0.6) (0.7)
Unemployed with 
Technical or professional 
skills
-18.9*** 16.5*** -19.6*** -20.8***
(2.0) (1.4) (0.6) (0.7)
Based on technical norms 
for labor training 
10.5*** 14.2***
(0.9) (1.1)
Lock out -39.5*** -28.2**
(9.4) (11.4)
Capacity training 28.2*** 21.7***
(1.4) (0.9)
On the job training -0.1 3.4***
(0.9) (0.9)
Productive training -26.4*** -17.9***
(0.9) (1.3)
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases.
Notes:
(1) Propensity score matching according to Becker and Ichino (2002).
(2) Non- parametric bootstrapping.
(3) MyPEs training, consists of courses offered in medium and small enterprises. 
(4) Self - employment modality is aimed  to offer knowledge and skills to develop a job.
(5) ILE modality trains to members of mutual or ganizations to improve the productivity. 
(6) Sinorcom modality offers courses  to workers to obtain a labor certification. 
Table 10. Employment ATT by modality
Treatment on the Treated Effect (TT) By Modalities
Assuming selection on unobservables:Parametric Method (1)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (2)
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Modality 13 26 13 26 13 26 13 26 13 26
School- based 108*** 168*** 16 -5
(16) (21) (87) (136)
Mixed 49*** 80*** 60* 45 81*** 82*** 77*** 183***
(15) (17) (33) (32) (19) (21) (27) (34)
MyPEs(3) 443*** 47 85 58 41 52* 63** 90***
(20) (14) (53) (42) (29) (31) (25) (33)
Self - employment(4) 2 16* 124 12 -31 -89 107 161** -7 16
(9) (9) (129) (62) (67) (56) (87) (79) (153) (96)
ILE(5) NC NC NA NA
Basic skills 2741*** 74 NA NA
(201) (39)
Sinorcom(6) 59*** 28 NA NA
(23) (23)
Health sector 6 42 NA NA
(76) (82)
Bouchers for training 147 151 1 621***
(221) (122) (221) (167)
Unemployed with 
Technical or professional 
skills
563 421** 342 204
(345) (206) (236) (141)
Based on technical norms 
for labor training 
177*** 215***
(42) (48)
Lock out
Capacity training 130*** 154***
(43) (47)
On the job training 46 226***
(42) (61)
Productive training -36 -43
(219) (149)
Source: Authors’ calculations using PROBECAT, ENEU and ENECE databases.
Notes:
(1) propensity score matching according to Becker and Ichino (2002).
(2) non- parametric  bootstrapping. 
(3) MyPEs training, consists of courses offered in medium and small enterprises. 
(4) Self - employment modality is aimed  to offer knowledge and skills to develop a job.
(5) ILE modality trains to members of mutual or ganizations to improve the productivity. 
(6) Sinorcom modality offers courses  to workers to obtain a labor certification. 
Table 11. Wage ATT by modality
Treatment on the Treated Effect (TT) By Modalities
Assuming selection on unobservables: Parametric Method(1)
In monthly current persos: bootstrapped confidence interval in parenthesis(2)
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4.7 Results by program modality and population group
We will now describe the impact by training modality. Tables 10 and 11 show the results for 
employment and wage effects, respectively.23 The most important regularity with respect to 
employment effects is that on-the-job training programs in firms with more than 30 employees 
(known as “programa mixto” until 2003 and as “formación laboral en competencias” in 2004) always 
have the largest positive effects of all the programs. On the other hand, the on-the-job training 
programs in small firms (less than 30 employees) have presented increasing effects, with negative 
effects until 2001 and positive effects since then. The training programs for self-employment 
(known as “capacitación para el autoemplo”) have had both positive (years 1999, 2003 and 2004) 
and negative effects (years 2002 to 2002). The once important school-based program was phased 
out in 2002 after a declining performance that went from positive effects in 1999 to negative effects 
in 2001. These figures agree with our previous comments on the growing employment effect on 
salaried workers and an irregular effect on self-employment. The wage effects from selection on-
observables show negative effects for every program for any modality throughout the period. When 
assuming selection on unobservables (see Table 11), all the wage effects become positive values.
Finally, Table 12 and Table 13, show the employment and wage effects on the treated by population 
groups according to gender, age, education, region and year quarter. For salaried workers (Table 
12) no regular pattern emerges for the whole period. However, if we concentrate on the years after 
2001/2002, the groups of women, of those with more than junior high school and of those taking 
the course during the first quarter, always display positive and larger employment effects. With 
respect to wages (Table 13), similar regularities are repeated for women and those with junior high 
school, but not for the other groups. For the self-employed, due to insufficient observations, many 
subgroups cannot be evaluated and no clear pattern can be described either for employment or 
wages. 
A Cost Benefit Analysis of the program shows at the aggregate level negative net results for almost 
all the years and for any type of employment, with positive results for 2000 and 2002 using our 
favored method of selection on unobservables. A stricter test (i.e., cost benefit results for results 
specific to the training modality) shows that estimated gains were positive for some years for 
salaried employment but always negative for self-employment24.
5. Conclusions
This paper summarizes an impact evaluation of the PROBECAT-SICAT training program for the 
unemployed in Mexico. The study refers to the performance of the program during the 2000-2004 
period by making use of several databases. It adopts two renowned methods for impact evaluation: 
First, propensity score matching for non-parametric measures of average effects, following Becker 
and Ichino (2002), and second, parametric measures of average effects correcting for selectivity, 
following Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2003). Hence, the study checks for the robustness of the 
estimated parameters to the assumptions of selection on observables and selection on unobservables. 
It also contrasts the use of either parametric or non-parametric measures of the parameters of 
interest. Our results give credence to the existence of an important hidden bias, but we show the 
estimates from both methods so that only robust results are reported.
The study provides evidence of a positive effect for salaried employment for most years and an irregular 
23 All these effects are computed assuming selection on un-observables. Tables with effects assuming selection on unobservables 
are available upon request.
24 A detailed Cost Benefit Analysis is presented in Delajara, Freije and Soloaga (2006).
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Modality 13 26 13 26 13 26 13 26 13 26
TOTAL
Gender
Men -5.2*** 18.5*** -4.5*** 6.0*** 16.6*** 22.3*** 17.0*** 3.7*** 3.4*** 8.8***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.5) (0.7) (0.7) (0.6) (0.5) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8)
Women 8.8*** 13.4*** -25.5*** -23.7*** 24.4*** 25.7*** 13.9*** 23.1*** 5.4*** 16.1***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
Age group
15-25 2.2*** 21.7*** -0.6 8.8*** 17.5*** 28.3*** 22.7*** 2.7*** 8.2*** 15.0***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
26-35 4.9*** -11.7*** -0.2 8.5*** 19.7*** 27.0*** -6.7*** 21.6*** -16.1*** -3.0***
(0.2) (0.2) (0.7) (0.9) (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (0.8) (1.1) (1.0)
more than 36 7.2*** 13.2*** 2.6** 1.0 38.2*** 28.4*** 4.4*** 11.7*** -10.9*** 1.9
(0.2) (0.3) (1.0) (1.6) (3.4) (2.9) (1.4) (1.5) (3.6) (2.6)
Schooling
Primary -0.2 18.6*** 12.0*** -1.8* 21.1*** 21.6*** 27.7*** 10.7*** 2.5 -5.9
(0.2) (0.3) (1.0) (1.0) (1.7) (1.7) (1.5) (1.8) (3.7) (5.1)
Junior High School -1.3*** 10.3*** 2.9*** 10.2*** 26.7*** 32.6*** 20.4*** 23.0*** 11.4*** -5.4***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (1.3) (1.8)
High School 5.7*** 0.4** -0.4 10.6*** 18.7*** 9.1*** NC NC 0.7 17.1***
(0.2) (0.2) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.8) (0.9) (0.8)
University -6.9** -9.0*** -19.7*** -9.0*** 17.0*** 16.1*** 20.1*** 14.4*** -2.9*** 16.1***
(2.8) (3.4) (1.3) (0.7) (1.9) (1.8) (0.5) (0.8) (0.4) (0.5)
Region
D.F. -75.6*** 8.1*** -16.3*** -67.4*** 16.4*** 38.3*** -38.6*** 5.1*** NC NC
(0.8) (0.5) (1.0) (2.9) (4.3) (8.6) (1.4) (0.5)
Center 10.2*** 12.9*** -22.9*** 9.3*** 24.3*** 10.3*** 12.8*** -32.7*** 16.1*** 21.6***
(0.5) (0.5) (1.4) (0.8) (3.4) (2.9) (0.9) (2.7) (2.0) (3.9)
Center-North 0.2 2.2*** -5.7*** 2.8** 20.9*** 28.6*** 29.7*** 10.5*** 2.5 -4.5*
(0.2) (0.2) (0.8) (1.1) (1.4) (0.9) (0.8) (1.6) (1.8) (2.4)
North -12.5*** 11.8*** -7.6*** 4.0*** 24.4*** 21.7*** 5.2*** 19.3*** -4.5*** -13.4***
(0.2) (0.2) (0.7) (0.6) (1.3) (1.3) (0.7) (0.8) (1.2) (1.7)
Gulf -59.3*** -5.5*** -19.0*** -8.4*** 30.6*** 27.7*** 31.2*** 25.5*** 15.0*** 18.9***
(0.6) (0.4) (0.9) (1.2) (1.5) (1.7) (1.4) (1.4) (3.4) (3.1)
Pacific -2.2* 12.4*** -0.7 7.8*** 14.4*** 12.6*** 33.6*** 28.7*** 40.7*** 26.2***
(1.2) (1.1) (1.0) (0.9) (3.2) (2.8) (1.8) (2.2) (2.3) (3.0)
South 10.6*** 17.1*** -29.3*** -19.4*** 11.3*** 15.3*** NC NC -61.3*** -5.2**
(0.5) (0.6) (2.8) (2.2) (2.1) (1.5) (3.4) (2.7)
Quarter
First 6.7*** 13.7*** 6.2*** 27.2*** 9.2*** 24.8*** 19.2*** 13.1*** 11.7*** 202***
(0.3) (0.3) (0.9) (0.7) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.8) (0.6)
Second -23.9*** 21.6*** 3.5*** -1.8* 25.4*** 21.9*** 8.5*** 0.1 -10.6*** -4.0***
(0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (0.9) (0.6) (0.6) (0.3) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6)
Third 17.5*** -3.3*** -17.7*** -4.0*** NA NA NC NC NA NA
(0.7) (1.2) (0.3) (0.3)
Fourth -16.1*** 11.9*** NC NC NA NA NA NA NA NA
(0.2) (0.1)
Notes:
(1) Selection correction according to Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2003). (2) non-paramtric bootstrapping.
(a) ENCOPE Surveys do not have information on wages and other payments.
NA No Available, NC Not Calculated (Insufficient observations).
Table 12. Employment ATT on salaried workers
Treatment on the Treated Effect (TT) By Population Group, Assuming selection on unobservables: Parametric Method (1), 
bootstrapped confidence interval in parenthesis(2)
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Non Salaried 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Modality 1998 1999 13 26 13 26 13 26 13 26 13 26
TOTAL
Gender
Men NA NA 670*** 33*** 43* 38 26 46 238*** 1664*** 65 171***
(29) (8) (26) (24) (30) (37) (47) (82) (51) (70)
Women NA NA NC NC 68*** 61*** 316*** 95*** 50** 293*** 170*** 227***
(22) (20) (44) (25) (21) (40) (59) (67)
Age group
15-25 NA NA NC NC 15 25* 171*** 53** 42** 90*** 34 89**
(11) (13) (30) (23) (21) (24) (31) (43)
26-35 NA NA 434*** 403*** 83* 117** 56 192*** 258*** 631*** 152 845***
(38) (38) (50) (47) (51) (70) (59) (91) (149) (170)
more than 36 NA NA 256*** 1185*** 47 201** 408*** 1247*** NC NC NC NC
(43) (63) (104) (83) (135) (269)
Schooling
Primary NA NA NC NC 102** 133*** 105** 319*** NC NC NC NC
(43) (38) (52) (95)
Junior High NA NA NC NC 85*** 108*** 86*** 26 67* 207*** 73 556***
(23) (24) (29) (23) (38) (49) (59) (110)
High School NA NA 377*** 1061*** 32 88** 567*** 141** NC NC 116 100
(31) (33) (27) (35) (84) (65) (75) (70)
University NA NA NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC
Region
D.F. NA NA 206*** 480*** NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC
(50) (57)
Center NA NA 1052*** 374*** 111 872*** NC NC NC NC NC NC
(48) (44) (71) (106)
Center-North NA NA NC NC 19 34 125*** 187*** 264*** 245*** 302*** 176*
(26) (31) (39) (45) (54) (57) (57) (101)
North NA NA 364*** 59*** 4 28 38 51 NC NC -60 331**
(27) (14) (23) (25) (35) (48) (201) (135)
Gulf NA NA 54*** 295*** 82* 210*** 757*** 1280*** NC NC NC NC
(15) (33) (49) (51) (160) (173)
Pacific NA NA 102* 102** 167** 401*** 216*** 247** 727*** 245*** NC NC
(59) (40) (83) (105) (77) (98) (102) (57)
South NA NA NC NC 151** 1016*** NC NC NC NC NC NC
(65) (127)
Quarter
First NA NA NC NC 53* 34 30 46* 265*** 901*** 147*** 122**
(31) (23) (22) (28) (40) (61) (56) (56)
Second NA NA 208*** 93*** 38* 126*** 97*** 400*** 1147*** 74** 172** 892***
(21) (19) (21) (33) (29) (54) (76) (37) (75) (123)
Third NA NA NC NC 6 74 NA NC NC NC NA NA
(38) (46)
Fourth NA NA 524*** 167*** NC NC NA NA NA NA NA NA
(22) (16)
Notes:
(1) selection correction according to Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2003). (2) non-paramtric bootstrapping.
(a) ENCOPE surveys do not have information on wages and other payments.
NA No Available, NC Not Calculated (Insufficient observations)
Table 13. Wage ATT on salaried workers
Treatment on the Treated Effect (TT) By Population Group, Assuming selection on unobservables:Parametric Method(1),
In monthly current pesos: bootstrapped confidence interval in parenthesis(2)
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Table 14. Cost benefit analysis
Year
Probability 
finding a 
job before 
training
Estim
ated 
w
age before 
training in 
pesos/m
o 
nth
Probability 
finding a 
job after 
training
Estim
ated 
w
age after 
training, 
in pesos 
m
onth
Expected 
w
age before 
training, 
in pesos/
m
onth
Expected 
w
age after 
training 
in pesos/
m
onth
Estim
ated 
gain(+)/
los s(-) in 
expected 
w
ages, 
in pesos/
m
onth
num
ber of 
participants
Total 
m
onthly 
gain(+)/
loss(-), in 
m
illions of 
pesos
Total 
m
onthly 
gain(+)/
los s(-), in 
m
illions of 
2004 pesos
Budget, in 
m
illions of 
2004 pesos 
per m
onth
Total 
m
onthly 
gain(+)/
los s(-), in 
m
illions of 
2004 pesos
a
b
c
d
e=a*b
f=c*d
g=f-e
h
i=g*h
j
k
l=j-k
C
ost Benefit A
nalysis for PRO
BECAT- general ATT controlling for N
on-observables
2000
0.328
1938
0.392
2425
636
950
314
593,175
186
228
127
101
2001
0.339
2031
0.437
1988
689
869
180
396,974
72
82
113
-31
2002
0.418
2135
0.584
2168
893
1265
373
230,185
86
94
66
28
2003
0.491
2508
0.500
2712
1231
1355
124
214,931
27
28
55
-28
2004
0.542
2696
0.407
2743
1463
1116
-346
207,239
-72
-72
42
-113
C
ost Benefit A
nalysis for PRO
BECAT- general ATT controlling for observables
2000
0.294
2185
0.315
1441
642
454
-189
593175
-112
-137
127
-264
2001
0.373
2378
0.256
1986
888
508
-380
396974
-151
-173
113
-286
2002
0.669
2856
0.637
2234
1909
1423
-486
230185
-112
-122
66
-188
2003
0.516
2853
0.518
2545
1473
1317
-156
214931
-33
-35
55
-90
2004 
0.541 
3390 
0.439 
2810 
1835 
1234 
-602 
207239 
-125 
-125 
42 
-166
Source: O
w
n estim
ates and STPS.
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self-employment effect (sometimes positive, sometimes negative) according to both methods. It also finds 
evidence of small positive wage effects for salaried workers and positive (but of varying size) wage effects 
for self-employed workers according to the selection method. This effect contrasts with wage effects that 
are always negative according to the method of propensity score matching. 
These effects (ATT) are accompanied by an important change in the selection mechanism of the program, 
due to the institutional changes adopted in 2002. Since then, when the school-based modality was 
phased-out and on-the-job training in large firms required an even larger percentage of trainee hiring, 
the general and the salaried employment effects of the program became greater than in previous years. 
The self-employment effect, however, kept its negative selection character. This means that the program 
participants have a smaller or equal employment probability advantage than the non-participants. The 
employment effect for the self-employed is both positive and negative depending on the method and the 
year of analysis.
All these methodological elements lead us to conclude that the program has a robust positive employment 
effect, particularly since 2002, under both methods and for all types of employment. However, because 
of the existence of an important hidden bias, the effects are smaller than usually measured by methods 
that assume selection on observables. Furthermore, also because of hidden bias, wage effects are small 
and positive, which seems more likely than the negative effects usually reported by methods that assume 
selection on observables.
Our results confirm the positive salaried employment effect found by Calderón and Trejo (2002) as well 
as by Navarro-Lozano (2001). Besides, our wage effects are much smaller than Sanchez-Navarro’s perhaps 
because we distinguish between salaried and self-employed workers. Our results also coincide with 
Calderón’s (2005) findings of positive effects on salaried employment, although we also find a positive 
effect on self-employment, which he does not.
In contrast with all the previous literature, we perform an inter-period analysis using two alternative 
methods and evaluate the impact for all modalities of the program and different population groups. Several 
conclusions can be drawn from this effort. First, there is evidence of an important hidden bias, so selection 
on observables alone can be a misleading assumption for gauging treatment effects. Second, there is also 
evidence that the program underwent important changes in 2002 that affected its selection mechanisms. 
This led to making the on-the-job training modality in large firms the most effective program, almost 
by construction. Third, women, those with junior high school and those taking courses during the first 
quarter of the year appear to be the groups most benefited by the program, particularly since 2002. 
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